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NOTES
PRIVATE POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE
TENSIONS BETWEEN STANLEY v. GEORGIA AND NEW
YORK v. FERBER
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has refused to in-
terpret the first amendment1 as an unconditional guarantee of free
speech.2 Although absolutists contend that the first amendment
protects all speech,3 the Court has always set limits short of this
broad interpretation.4 The problem of sexually explicit speech has
plagued the Court in its efforts to define the scope of the first
amendment.5 Repeated attempts to formulate a standard of first
amendment protection regarding sexually explicit speech have di-
vided the Court and resulted in confusing applications of the law.'
Members of the Court have agreed, however, on one important as-
pect of this issue: the Constitution protects the private possession
of otherwise unprotected speech in the home.7 For more than fif-
teen years this principle has been a touchstone of personal liberty
in an age of increasing governmental intrusion into daily life.
1. "Congress shall make no law. . abridging the freedom of speech ... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
For an in-depth discussion of the extent of this application, see Van Alstyne, A Graphic
Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 142-48 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). "There are certain...
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting." Id. at 571-72 (citation omitted).
3. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6 (1970) (arguing that the individual's achievement of self-fulfill-
ment through expression is an independent first amendment value).
4. E.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. "It is well understood that the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." Id.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 23-31.
6. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court invalidated a con-
viction under Georgia's obscenity law because the jury had misapplied the standard for of-
fensive speech to ban exhibition of the film Carnal Knowledge.
7. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
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Consistent with its early holding that the first amendment does
not protect obscene speech," the Court has gradually refined and
narrowed the scope of first amendment protection afforded to sex-
ually explicit speech.9 A common thread in the Court's develop-
ment and application of each new standard has been its balancing
of the harm to the community from the circulation of obscene ma-
terial against the harm to the community when speech is
restricted.10
In New York v. Ferber," the Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of state statutes restricting child pornography that was not le-
gally obscene.' 2 The Court applied its balancing test and held that
the statutes were within the state's power to protect the welfare of
its children.' s In Ferber, the Court recognized a new level of harm
to the community-the physical and psychological abuse of chil-
dren-and on that basis permitted states to prohibit the produc-
tion and distribution of child pornography regardless of whether it
was legally obscene.' 4
Armed with the justification of protecting child victims, 5 some
states have extended their child pornography statutes to prohibit
private possession of child pornography. 6 These statutes are in di-
8. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 22-32.
10. The Supreme Court has made clear that the important element in this balancing is
not the content of the speech but the fact that speech might be restricted because of its
content. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties
[given speech and press by the first amendment] ... " Id. at 484. See also Schauer, Codify-
ing the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 286-87 (pointing out
that the cases shaping the development of first amendment protection of speech have in-
volved not meaningful political dissent but ideas such as those expressed by Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, the Ku Klux Klan, and the American Nazi Party).
11. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
12. The Court has defined child pornography as "works that visually depict sexual con-
duct by children below a specified age." Id. at 764 (emphasis in original). The current Su-
preme Court test for obscenity is set out in note 30 infra.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 756-58.
15. Id. at 756-60.
16. For example, the Illinois statute provides that "[a] person commits the offense of
child pornography who. . .with the knowledge of the nature or content thereof, . . . pos-
sesses any . . . visual reproduction of any child . . . engaged in any [prohibited sexual]
activity .. " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
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rect conflict with the principle espoused by the Court in Stanley v.
Georgia17 that the Constitution protects the private possession of
obscene material in the home. 18 Supporters of state legislation
criminalizing private possession have emphasized the state's inter-
est in protecting child victims. They argue that the Court should
adopt the rationale that failed in Stanley: that the harm caused by
obscene speech is greater than the danger inherent in prohibiting
speech.' 9 In State v. Meadows 20 the Ohio Supreme Court adopted
this rationale, holding that the state's interest in protecting chil-
dren from physical and psychological abuse outweighed the protec-
tion of speech under the first amendment.2
The decision in Meadows sets the state interests vindicated in
Ferber on a collision course with the constitutional protections es-
tablished in Stanley. This Note explores the policies behind the
Court's decisions in Stanley and Ferber and analyzes the decision
in Meadows in light of these policies. The Note concludes that leg-
islation criminalizing the private possession of child pornography
is not directly related to the harms intended to be prevented and is
therefore an unreasonable restriction of important first and fourth
amendment values.
APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO OBSCENE SPEECH
In Roth v. United States,22 the first case to challenge the consti-
tutionality of federal obscenity laws, the Supreme Court refused to
extend first amendment protection to obscene speech. Justice
Brennan wrote that "implicit in the history of the First Amend-
ment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming so-
cial importance. ' 2 The Court's first definition of obscenity proved
difficult for lower courts to apply.24 Nine years later, in Memoirs v.
17. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
19. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-67.
20. 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
21. Id. at 52, 503 N.E.2d at 704-05.
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. Id. at 484.
24. The Court in Roth adopted as its test of obscenity "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489. The difficulties in applying this standard
became evident in subsequent cases. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705
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Massachusetts, the Court, in a plurality opinion , emphasized that
this standard required disputed material to be "utterly without re-
deeming social value."25 This definition reflected an attempt to
safeguard first amendment values and sent a message to lower
courts that all but the most hard-core material was protected.
Requiring the prosecution to prove a negative-that the dis-
puted material was "utterly without redeeming social
value"-made a conviction for obscenity nearly impossible to ob-
tain. 26 The practical difficulties of such a standard quickly became
obvious, and the following Term, the Court revised its obscenity
standard in Redrup v. New York. 2 7 The new test called for a com-
munity standard of judgment in determining whether the material
was "utterly without redeeming social value. '28 The subjective na-
ture of the Redrup test left lower courts little guidance, however,
and the Supreme Court found itself the frequent arbiter of
whether material was legally obscene.29 In Miller v. California, the
Court again reworked its standard for obscenity, this time revising
the value test to protect material having serious artistic, scientific,
political or literary value.30 Although lower courts have sometimes
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("there is among the present members of the Court a sharp
divergence as to the proper application of the standards in Roth"); T. EMERSON, supra note
3, at 474-81, 490-91.
25. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (empha-
sis in original).
26. Reviewing the Memoirs standard seven years later, the Court observed that the bur-
den on the prosecution was "virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards
of proof." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
27. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
28. The new test required that the material be patently offensive by community stan-
dards, that its dominant theme appeal to a prurient interest in sex, and that it be utterly
without redeeming social value. Id. at 770-71.
29. Justice Harlan criticized the Court's approach to the obscenity cases, complaining
that "anyone who undertakes to examine the Court's decisions since Roth which have held
particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself in utter bewilderment." Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: . . . whether 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . whether. . . the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct. . . and
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. at 19 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972)).
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misapplied this test,31 it remains the standard by which courts de-
termine whether sexually explicit speech receives first amendment
protection.2
Stanley v. Georgia
During its reworking of the obscenity standard, the Court estab-
lished an important exception to the general rule that the first
amendment does not protect obscene speech. In Stanley v. Geor-
gia,33 the state prosecuted a private citizen for possession of films
that were obscene under the Miller test. The Court unanimously
reversed the conviction, declaring that "[i]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch. '3 4
The Court's opinion in Stanley established, at least in dictum,
the "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their so-
cial worth."3 5 Later cases quickly demonstrated, however, that the
first and fourth amendment protections articulated in Stanley did
not extend to the right to deliver3 or import 7 obscene material. In
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,"8 the Court further limited its
holding in Stanley by refusing to extend first amendment protec-
tion to obscene material exhibited in the "privacy" of an adult the-
ater. The Court held that a commercial theater could not be
31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32. E.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1972); State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43,
503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
33. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
34. Id. at 565.
35. Id. at 564. In discussing the foundations of this right, the Court cited Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (the principle of a free press includes distribution as well as publi-
cation) and Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 144 (1943) (first amendment protections
encompass the right to distribute and receive literature).
36. In United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court refused to extend its hold-
ing in Stanley to protect the delivery of obscene materials. The majority rejected the ration-
ale that "if a person has the right to receive and possess [obscene] material, then someone
must have the right to deliver it to him." Reidel, 402 U.S. at 355.
37. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (rejecting
the argument that Stanley protected the right to import obscene material for personal use);
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (concluding that Stanley
did not protect the importation of obscene materials for commercial use).
38. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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equated with a private home and that the privacy interest pro-
tected in Stanley did not follow the material outside the home.39
The rationale offered by the Court to justify this restriction on
first amendment freedoms was the public interest "in the quality
of life and the total community environment. '40
Although the Court decided Stanley on first amendment
grounds,4' Justice Marshall's majority opinion also invoked fourth
amendment 42 prohibitions on unreasonable search and seizure.43 At
least two other Supreme Court Justices have indicated that the
Court decided Stanley on both first and fourth amendment
grounds. 44 The Court has applied its holding in Stanley narrowly, 45
indicating that it does not intend the case to be a vehicle for the
expansion of first amendment protection of obscene material.4 6
The view that the protections established in Stanley were based
on both the first and fourth amendments may serve, however, to
maintain Stanley as a viable shield to protect private possession of
speech despite the Court's continued narrow construction of the
case.
4 7
39. Id. at 65-67.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. "We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime." Id. See also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (confirming that the decision in Stanley was firmly
grounded in the first amendment).
42. The fourth amendment provides, in part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their . . . houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43. Justice Marshall referred to the "right to be free . . . from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy" and "the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents
of [one's] library." Stanley, 394 U.S. 564-65.
44. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun asserted that
"Stanley rested as much on the Court's understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it did
on the First." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Stanley also emphasized the fourth amendment issues in the case.
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 569-72 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and White joined
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion.
45. See Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 71-72 (1974).
46. See State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 46-47, 503 N.E.2d 697, 700-01 (1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
47. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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New York v. Ferber
A new version of obscenity, child pornography, gained wide-
spread circulation in the 1970s."' In 1982 the Supreme Court first
addressed state sanctions against child pornography. New York v.
Ferber9 involved the prosecution of a bookstore proprietor for sell-
ing two child pornography films to an undercover law enforcement
officer.50 The New York statute criminalizing the distribution of
material depicting a sexual performance by a child did not require
the material to meet the legal definition of obscenity.51 The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction under
this statute, holding that the statute prohibited "the promotion of
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protec-
tion . . under the First Amendment."52
In reversing the New York court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that "the constitutionally permissible regula-
tion of pornography could. . . be more extensive" when that ma-
terial involved depictions of children.53 The Court offered five rea-
sons to support its holding that state laws regulating child
pornography were reviewable under a more lenient standard than
other legislation affecting first amendment rights.
First, the Court found that a state's interest in safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of its minors was compel-
ling. 4 In particular, the Court emphasized that "[t]he prevention
of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a govern-
ment objective of surpassing importance." 55 The Court specifically
48. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 599-601 (1986)
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the
Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 711, 713.
49. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
50. Id. at 751-52.
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10 (McKinney 1980) prohibits promotion of an obscene sexual
performance by a child. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263-15 (McKinney 1980) prohibits promotion of
the same conduct, but without the requirement that it be obscene. The defendant was
charged under both statutes and convicted by the trial court under § 263-15. Ferber, 458
U.S. at 752.
52. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 675, 678, 422 N.E.2d 523, 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865
(1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
53. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
54. Id. at 756-57.
55. Id. at 757.
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declined to "second-guess [the] legislative judgment . . . that the
use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child."" a
Second, the Court addressed the relationship between the distri-
bution of child pornography and the sexual abuse of children. Be-
cause the material is a permanent record of the child victim's par-
ticipation in sexual acts, circulation of the material exacerbates the
harm caused by the original production.5 7 The Court reasoned that
the state had to abolish the distribution network "if the produc-
tion of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children
is to be effectively controlled. ' 58 It authorized direct state action
against distributors to achieve this end.59 The Court also held that
states need not conform their laws regulating child pornography to
the obscenity test set out in Miller v. California." Because the
Miller standard did not reflect "the State's particular and more
compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of children," its criteria did not afford "a satisfactory
solution to the child pornography problem." 61
Third, the Court noted that the economic motive afforded by the
advertisement and sale of child pornography was "an integral part
of the production of such materials. '62 This was perhaps an ac-
knowledgment of the extensive involvement of organized crime in
the child pornography industry.63 The Court easily found that the
distribution of this material provided an economic incentive for its
production and thus perpetuated the sexual abuse of children. 4
Fourth, the Court found that "[t]he value of permitting live per-
formances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in
56. Id. at 758 (footnote omitted).
57. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981).
58. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
59. Id. at 760. The Court noted that the prosecution of distributors might be "[tihe most
expeditious if not the only practical method. . . to dry up the market for this material." Id.
60. Id. at 760-61.
61. Id. at 761.
62. Id.
63. See Note, The Child Protection Act of 1984: Child Pornography and the First
Amendment, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 346 (1985).
64. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
194 [Vol. 29:187
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lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis."5
Invoking the value prong of the Miller test, the Court considered it
"unlikely that [such] depictions. . . would often constitute an im-
portant and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific
or educational work.""6
Fifth, the Court noted that a content-based analysis of first
amendment protection was not incompatible with its earlier deci-
sions.6 7 The creation of a new, content-based restriction on speech
was justified, the Court reasoned, when "within the confines of the
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly out-
weighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake."6 " Having thus cat-
egorized the interests involved, the Court concluded that "[w]hen a
definable class of material, such as [child pornography], bears so
heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production,. . . the balance of competing interests is clearly struck
and. . . it is permissible to consider these materials as without the
protection of the First Amendment."6 9 Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion emphasized the importance of this balancing element.
Although she recognized that the New York statute might encom-
pass legitimate clinical or sociological depictions of adolescent sex-
uality, she concluded that the relative value of such depictions and
the potential that the statute might prohibit protected speech were
not sufficiently significant to justify invalidating the statute. 0
The Court also addressed the defendant's claims that the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would reach material
that would not "threaten the harms sought to be combatted by the
State."'71 The New York Court of Appeals had recognized this
threat and held that the statute was unconstitutionally over-
65. Id. at 762.
66. Id. at 762-63.
67. Id. at 763. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983) (discussing the Supreme Court's content-based analysis of first amend-
ment protection of speech).
68. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64.
69. Id. at 764.
70. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Stone, supra note 67, at 195 (describing
the factors considered by the Court in a content-based analysis of "low-value" speech).
71. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
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broad.712 The Supreme Court, however, extended the substantial
overbreadth requirement of Broadrick v. Oklahoma to "traditional
forms of expression such as books and films"'7 and ruled that the
statute's potential overbreadth was insufficient to invalidate it. 74
Referring to the statute's possible chilling effect on protected ex-
pression, such as "medical textbooks . . . [or] pictorials in the Na-
tional Geographic," the Court registered its "serious[] doubt...
that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute
amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the
statute's reach. ' 75 It further refused to assume that state courts
would increase the potentially invalid scope of the statute by giv-
ing it an expansive construction.78 The Court instead determined
that a case-by-case analysis would be sufficient to preclude over-
broad applications of the statute.7
The Conflict in State v. Meadows
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State v. Meadows,7s
the first case to juxtapose the first amendment principle affirmed
in Stanley v. Georgia and the strong state interest recognized in
New York v. Ferber. John Meadows was convicted in Ohio Munici-
pal Court of possessing material depicting a minor engaging in sex-
ual activity.79 As in Stanley, the defendant did not dispute the
state's power to regulate the material in question.80 As in Stanley,
the state did not allege that the defendant possessed the material
72. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), rev'd, 458
U.S. 747 (1982).
73. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771-74. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court held that "particu-
larly where conduct and not merely speech is involved .... the overbreadth of a statute
must ... be substantial ... judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."
413 U.S. 602, 615 (1973). Ferber marked the Court's first application of the "substantial
overbreadth" doctrine to a case involving pure speech. See generally Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
74. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. The Court stated, "We consider this the paradigmatic case of
a state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 773-74.
78. 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
79. Id. at 44, 503 N.E.2d at 698.
80. State v. Meadows, No. C-850091, slip op. at 3 (Ohio App. Dec. 18, 1985) ("counsel...
stipulate[d] the unlawful nature of the publications"), rev'd, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d
[Vol. 29:187
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in connection with any other illegal purpose, such as distribution
or production."1 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed Meadow's
conviction, holding that the state could not prohibit the "mere pri-
vate possession of. . .pornography in the home.18 2
The appeals court rested its decision on the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Stanley that the first amendment protected
"the mere private possession of obscene matter."83 The court char-
acterized the decision in Ferber as establishing the standard of
constitutional protection for child pornography, as Miller v. Cali-
fornia had for adult obscenity. 4 In considering whether Stanley or
Ferber should control, Judge Shannon, writing for the majority,
stated:
I can derive no method, directly or subliminally, from Ferber
to advance what surely must be society's purpose to eradicate
the traffic in [child pornography]. It is of great significance to
me that, in Stanley, the Court rejected the contention by the
State of Georgia that to eliminate the traffic in pornography, it
is necessary to bar mere private possession by an individual.8 5
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that the state's
interest in "preserving its children's privacy and protecting them
from . ..cruel physiological, mental, and emotional abuse" out-
weighed first amendment interests in protecting private possession
of child pornography.88 The court determined that the state inter-
ests asserted in Stanley, "to protect the individual possessor's
mind.., and to prevent future deviant sexual behavior linked to
exposure to obscene materials, '87 were not the same as those raised
in Meadows. Instead, the state's interests paralleled those articu-
698 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987). See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 n.2
(1969) ("[a]ppellant does not argue that the films are not obscene").
81. Meadows, slip op. at 5 ("[t]here is no indication, directly or by innuendo, that Mead-
ows sold, produced, or disseminated the material possessed by him"); State v. Stanley, 224
Ga. 259, 260-61, 161 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
82. Meadows, slip op. at 8.
83. Id. at 7 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559).
84. Meadows, slip op. at 7-8.
85. Id.
86. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 52, 503 N.E.2d 697, 704 (1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
87. Id. at 47, 503 N.E.2d at 700.
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lated by the Supreme Court in Ferber.S" The court concluded by
deferring to the Ohio legislature's determination that prohibiting
the possession of child pornography was necessary "to halt sexual
exploitation and abuse of children."89
THE PROBLEM OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Justice White began his opinion in New York v. Ferber by not-
ing that "[i]n recent years, the exploitive use of children in the
production of pornography has become a serious national prob-
lem."90 Experts estimate that an explosive growth in child pornog-
raphy occurred during the 1970s.9 1 Although much of the early ma-
terial was of foreign origin, pornography has increasingly involved
American children.2 After hearings held in 1977,93 the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee concluded that "child pornography and child
prostitution have become highly organized, multi-million dollar in-
dustries that operate on a nationwide scale. '9 4 One estimate has
put the annual revenue of the child pornography industry in the
early 1970s at more than $2.4 billion. 5
The rapid and unexpected growth in the exploitation of children
for profit prompted a flurry of protective federal and state legisla-
tion.96 In particular, Congress passed the Protection of Children
88. Id. at 49-50, 503 N.E.2d at 702.
89. Id. at 51-52, 503 N.E.2d at 704.
90. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982).
91. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 601; (by 1977, child pornography
had become part of the commercial mainstream of pornography); Note, supra note 48, at
713.
92. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 601-02, 601 n.410; Dudar, America
Discovers Child Pornography, Ms., Aug. 1977, at 80 (child pornography operations have
been uncovered in Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, and New York City).
93. Hearings were held from May to September 1977 by the House Subcommittee on the
Judiciary, the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, and the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 600 & nn.401,
403.
94. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 40, 42.
95. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 544.
96. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.2 (1982). For a review of pre-1978
federal and state legislation covering child pornography, see Note, Child Pornography Leg-
islation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505 (1978-1979).
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Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 197797 to attack the national
traffic in child pornography. The Act prohibited the production of
any "sexually explicit" material destined for interstate commerce
which employed a child under the age of sixteen.9 1 It also prohib-
ited the transportation, mailing, or receipt of child pornography in
interstate commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution for
sale.99
Loopholes in the 1977 Act frustrated its enforcement against
some violators. Its major flaw, the requirement of a commercial
purpose, allowed those who produced child pornography for per-
sonal use or barter to escape federal prosecution.100 It also failed to
prohibit distribution of material that was not obscene. 10 1 Although
the Act included prohibitions against production, the clandestine
nature of the production of child pornography made convictions
under the Act virtually nonexistent. 102 After 1978, traffic in child
pornography, went underground, and noncommercial distribution
flourished in the absence of federal sanctions. 103
In 1984, Congress passed the Child Protection Act 104 to remedy
these weaknesses. Reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in
Ferber, Congress eliminated the obscenity requirement of the 1977
Act, removed the commercial purpose requirement from the prohi-
bition against interstate trafficking, receipt, or mailing, and raised
the protected age to eighteen.105 Federal prosecutions increased
dramatically as a result of these revisions. o According to the At-
torney General's Commission, the 1977 Act "effectively halted the
bulk of the commercial child pornography industry," and the 1984
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982).
98. Id. § 2251(a).
99. Id. § 2252.
100. Loken, The Federal Battle Against Child Sexual Exploitation: Proposals for Re-
form, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S LAW J. 105, 112 (1986); 1 ArrORNEY GENERAL'S RLPORT, supra note
48, at 604.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982). For a discussion of the practical effects of this obscenity
requirement, see Note, supra note 63, at 336.
102. 1 AT-ORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 604 n.421.
103. Id. at 604-05.
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2255 (Supp. III 1985).
105. Id.
106. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 606.
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revisions allowed federal officials to proceed against noncommer-
cial producers and distributors. 10 7
National concern over child pornography focused on the children
victimized by the production of this material. 08 Those who favored
strong sanctions against the sale and distribution of child pornog-
raphy argued that its suppression was necessary to prevent the
abuse of children in the production process. 109 In hearings held
pursuant to the enactment of the 1977 Act, Congress assumed that
the production of sexually explicit material involving children was
child abuse per se and therefore was not entitled to first amend-
ment protection. 110
Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ferber, the
1984 Act sought primarily to protect children, not to combat por-
nography."' The unique element of child pornography that distin-
guishes it from pornography using adult subjects and justifies
stricter regulation is that the child victim cannot give his or her
consent to perform and be photographed." 2 The child victim is in-
jured not only by his role in the original production, but also be-
cause the materials exist and continue to circulate."13
Whereas federal legislation must rest its authority on the move-
ment of child pornography in interstate commerce, the states are
free to exercise their police power to prohibit all production and
distribution of child pornography." 4 States' early attempts at leg-
islation, however, often suffered from the same weaknesses as the
first federal statute." 5 Before the Supreme Court decided Ferber,
fifteen states limited the reach of their child pornography statutes
to material that was legally obscene."' In the wake of Ferber, some
107. Id. at 607.
108. Note, supra note 63, at 327.
109. E.g., 123 CONG. REC. 33-050 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Roth); Sexual Exploitation of
Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (statement of Rep. Kildee).
110. Note, Child Pornography, the First Amendment, and the Media; The Constitution-
ality of Super-Obscenity Laws, 4 COMM/ENT 115, 121 (1981-1982).
111. Note, supra note 63, at 330-31.
112. People v. Spargo, 103 Il. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982).
113. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 545.
114. "The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate .. " Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
115. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.2 (1982).
116. Id.
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states toughened their laws not only as to the content of this mate-
rial, but also as to the range of prohibited acts.117
In 1985, the Utah state legislature amended its child pornogra-
phy laws to prohibit the private possession of child pornography., s
The legislature read Ferber as establishing different standards for
child pornography than for adult material. It concluded that the
policies underlying Ferber allowed states to prohibit even the pri-
vate possession of child pornography. 9 In support of this stricter
standard, the legislature determined that the elimination of the
market for child pornography was necessary to prevent exploita-
tion of children. 120 The lawmakers also noted that evidence had
connected prolonged viewing of pornography to antisocial
behavior. 121
APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PRIVATE POSSESSION OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Analysis of Obscenity Law
The Court's treatment of obscenity cases has involved several
levels of analysis. In an early decision, Roth v. United States, the
Court simply concluded that the first amendment did not protect
obscene material because it was "no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas" and did not contribute to "the social interest in or-
der and morality.' 22 Similarly, the Court in New York v. Ferber
began its first amendment analysis by citing cases that had classi-
fied obscenity as outside the realm of constitutionally protected
expression. 23
117. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 38, para. 11-20.1 (Supp. 1986) (effective Jan. 1, 1984);
MINN. STAT. § 617.246 (Supp. 1987) (amended 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.322
(Supp. 1985) (amended 1984). See generally State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 51 n.10,
503 N.E.2d 697, 704 n.10 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
118. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3 (Supp. 1987).
119. Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 95, 172, 177.
120. Id. at 173, 178.
121. Id. at 176 (citing D. SCOTT, PORNOGRAPHY: ITS EFFECTS ON THE FAMILY, COMMUNITY
AND CULTURE (1985)). Scott presents a distinctly unobjective discussion of the connection
between pornography and violent crime.
122. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
123. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982).
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In later cases, however, the Court emphasized the need to pro-
tect "the sensibilities . . . of the general public. 12 4 This recogni-
tion of competing interests indicates that even obscene speech has
some value against which to weigh the justifications for restric-
tion. 25 This content-based analysis first distinguishes between
"low-value" and "high-value" speech on the basis of subject matter
and then applies a balancing test to determine the circumstances
under which. that speech may be restricted."26 The post-Roth ob-
scenity cases, including Stanley and Ferber, employed this value-
based analysis and balancing test.12
7
The decision in Ferber established child pornography as a sepa-
rate form of sexually explicit speech whose production and distri-
bution the states may prohibit without resorting to the test for le-
gal obscenity. 2 " Regardless of the content-based value that is
assigned to child pornography, however, this speech-all
speech-takes on a higher value when it is associated with the in-
dividual's right to possess it "in the privacy of his own home." ' If
the Court continues to employ a balancing test based on the value
of the speech at issue, the private possession of child pornogra-
phy-like the private possession of any speech-will merit a value
commensurate with the constitutional protections it invokes.
State Court Decisions
In 1982, several state courts considered the constitutionality of
statutes criminalizing noncommercial conduct involving child por-
nography. Following Ferber, these courts held that the state's
strong interests in protecting children allowed it to proscribe activ-
ity that increased the demand for child pornography. In People v.
124. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 58 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973).
125. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir. 1985) (be-
cause pornography influences politics and social relations and controls attitudes at home
and in the legislature, it has value as speech).
126. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 67, at 195.
127. Schauer, supra note 10, at 306-08. Schauer finds this analysis the most persuasive in
describing the basis for the Court's decision in Ferber.
128. The Court in Ferber held that states could prohibit the production and distribution
of child pornography regardless of whether it was legally obscene, because the harm oc-
curred despite this classification. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
129. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
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Spargo, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the state's interest
in preventing the solicitation of children for the production of
child pornography justified a ban on the noncommercial exhibition
of child pornography. 13 0 As in Ferber, the court focused not on a
generalized harm to society, but on the state's "strong and compel-
ling interest. . . in preventing children from becoming involved in
the production of child pornography.' 31
The court in People v. Godek 32 cited Judge Jasen's dissenting
opinion in People v. Ferber33 in upholding a statute that banned
the private display of child pornography to consenting adults even
without sufficient proof that the child participants resided in that
state.13 4 The court focused on the economic incentive argument,
emphasizing that the statute's purpose was the protection of "the
minors whose involvement will continue only so long as there is
some market, public or private, for the finished product.' 1 35
These state cases echo Ferber in supporting legislative attempts
to broaden the attack on child pornography. Following Judge
Jasen's lead, 3 " courts have abandoned the public morality argu-
ment that failed in Stanley v. Georgia 37 in favor of asserting the
state's compelling interest in safeguarding the physical and psy-
chological well-being of minors. 38 The harm to the child victim
stems not only from the potential for physical abuse during pro-
duction but also from the knowledge that "the recording is circu-
lating within the mass distribution system for child pornogra-
phy.' 39 States are therefore free to attack both commercial and
noncommercial distribution in order to reach this exploitation ef-
130. People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 286-87, 431 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1982).
131. Id. at 286, 431 N.E.2d at 31.
132. 113 Misc. 2d 599, 449 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047
(1984).
133. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 681, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526, 449 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867
(1981) (Jasen, J., dissenting), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
134. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d at 610, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
135. Id. at 608, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 435. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761
(1982).
136. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d at 685-86, 422 N.E.2d at 529-30, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
137. 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969).
138. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)).
139. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 545.
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fectively. 140 Finally, the need to remove economic incentives for
participation in the industry also justifies a rejection of over-
breadth claims.'
The Protection of Private Possession
In State v. Meadows, the state of Ohio argued that the Supreme
Court in Ferber had enunciated a different standard for child por-
nography than for other types of obscene material, and that this
standard would permit states to prohibit the private possession of
child pornography.' 42 This argument, however, confuses the stan-
dard of protection with the permissible remedy. By establishing a
different test for child pornography than for adult pornography,
the Supreme Court simply recognized that the production itself
was more harmful when it involved children. This recognition of
greater harm from production does not necessarily indicate greater
harm from private possession, nor does it give to states the same
freedom to regulate private possession that Ferber conferred re-
garding production.
Analysis of Harm
The argument that states should be permitted to regulate child
pornography more severely than adult pornography begins with
the proposition that child pornography harms the actors because
they are too young to give their consent to participate and be pho-
tographed. 143 Child pornography, the argument continues, is there-
fore inherently more harmful than adult pornography, and this
greater harm justifies allowing the states a greater reach in regulat-
ing production.'4 The states' strong interest in protecting the wel-
140. People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 285, 431 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1982).
141. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771; see People v. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d 599, 608, 449 N.Y.S.2d
428, 435 (Sup. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984).
142. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 48-49, 503 N.E.2d 697, 702 (1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
143. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d at 285-87, 431 N.E.2d at 30-31.
144. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 503 N.E.2d at 703. For arguments that the produc-
tion of adult pornography can be as harmful to adult actors as the production of child por-
nography is to child actors, see Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality Another Woman's Por-
nography?, Ms., Apr. 1985, at 37; Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on
the Regulation of Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 20-23 (1984). But see 1 ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 412. The Attorney General's Commission stated that
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fare of its children justifies extending the scope of its regulation
beyond that permitted in regulating the general welfare.'45 The Su-
preme Court extended the scope of permissible regulation in Fer-
ber by allowing states to regulate child pornography without re-
gard to the obscenity requirement established in Miller v.
California.
Ferber therefore established that because the production of child
pornography is itself harmful, the states can regulate some aspects
of child pornography without regard to whether the material is ob-
scene. 4 ' In approving a lower threshold for the regulation of child
pornography than for adult pornography, the Court acknowledged
that child pornography is not a victimless crime. 47 If sexually ex-
plicit material depicts children, it probably does not fall within the
protection of the first amendment, but if the material depicts
adults, it may be protected, subject to the obscenity test in Miller
v. California.145 The Ferber decision placed all child pornography
on the same footing as obscene adult pornography 49 and thus ena-
bled states to prosecute child pornography on a broader scale than
adult pornography. The distinction between child and adult por-
nography, therefore, concerns what materials may be regulated
rather than how they may be regulated.' 50
"harms to performers involved would not otherwise be taken to be a sufficient condition for
restriction of the photographs rather than the underlying conduct." Id.
145. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57.
146. The potential for harm to the child victims is the same regardless of whether the
material is legally obscene. Id. at 761.
147. Id. at 758 & n.9.
148. 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973).
149. The Court in Ferber stated:
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunci-
ated in Miller, but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity. The
Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it
is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offen-
sive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
150. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 6, State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d
697 (1986) (No. 86-233), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
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Application of Constitutional Protections
The Supreme Court established in Stanley that the permissible
reach of a state's power to regulate in furtherance of its citizens'
welfare was circumscribed by the protections of the Bill of
Rights.1 51 The particular rights involved in the private possession
of otherwise unlawful material-the guarantees of the first and
fourth amendments-work synergistically to protect the possession
of material that otherwise would not merit protection. 152 Previous
cases established that private noncommercial possession of unpro-
tected material outside the home is not entitled to constitutional
protection.15 3 Material that is completely outside the first amend-
ment likewise receives no special protection simply because it is in
the home. 154 In Stanley, however, the Court established that the
combination of first and fourth amendment protections prohibited
a state from reaching into a person's home to seize unprotected
material when that material involved speech. 55
151. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
152. See id. at 563-64.
153. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (denying constitutional protection to the
private exchange of obscene materials outside the home); United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d
978 (11th Cir. 1985) (no right to receive child pornography through the mails); People v.
Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982) (allowing prosecution of private exhibi-
tion of child pornography); People v. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d 599, 449 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984) (state could proscribe private display of child por-
nography to consenting adults).
154. The Court in Stanley stated: "What we have said in no way infringes upon the
power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as nar-
cotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. . . . No First Amendment rights are involved in
most statutes making mere possession criminal." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11. In holding
that Ohio could criminalize the private possession of child pornography, the Supreme Court
of Ohio interpreted this footnote to allow states to reach otherwise-protected speech if it
found "compelling reasons . . . for overriding the right of the individual to possess those
materials." Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 47, 503 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at
568 n.11). In footnote 11, however, Justice Marshall's example of such a compelling reason
deals with the possession of material that "could be used to the injury of the United States
or to the advantage of any foreign nation." Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(d) (1982)). Private possession of child pornography hardly rises to the level of posses-
sion of state secrets. The Supreme Court of Ohio's misapplication of footnote 11 thus does
not support its holding adequately. See Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 357, 503 N.E.2d at 716
(Brown, J., concurring).
155. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. Although the Court premised its holding in Stanley
solely on first amendment grounds, both the language of Justice Marshall's opinion and
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In criminalizing the possession of child pornography, the Utah
legislature cited the need to protect children from exploitation. 56
It reasoned that child pornography was used as part of the act of
child abuse, to induce the child's participation in pornographic
productions. 157 Notwithstanding such a relationship, the legisla-
ture's solution, prohibiting private possession, ignores the funda-
mental principles of the Supreme Court's first amendment
jurisprudence.158
In evaluating whether sexually explicit speech should be pro-
tected under the first amendment, the Court has used a content-
based analysis that incorporates a balancing test to determine the
circumstances under which the speech may be restricted. 59 Al-
though the holding in Stanley established that the right to possess
material in one's home was of sufficient value to survive the state's
interest in regulating that material,6 0 the Court did not preclude
the possibility that a state interest could rise to a level sufficient to
outweigh the first amendment interests at stake in Stanley.'6' In
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, Chief Justice Burger cited a mi-
nority report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
indicating "at least an arguable correlation between obscene mate-
rial and crime.' 62 This issue of possible harm to third parties is
significant because under the Court's current content-based analy-
later commentary support the conclusion that fourth amendment rights are also involved.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
156. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-1 (Supp. 1986).
157. D. Scorr, supra note 121, at 9; 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at
649-50. The evidence that indicates that child abusers use child pornography to lower their
victim's inhibitions also indicates that they can and do use adult pornography for the same
purpose. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 686.
158. See, e.g., Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. See also T. EMERSON, supra note 3, at 494. "As-
suming obscene material could be proved to create a ... danger of illegal behavior, it would
not follow that the expression should be suppressed. Rather, the basic principles of a system
of freedom of expression would require that society deal directly with the . . action and
leave the expression alone." Id.
159. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64; Stone, supra note 67, at 195.
160. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
161. See id. at 567 ("Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more pro-
hibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct
.") (emphasis added).
162. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (citing U.S. Comm'n on
Obscenity & Pornography, The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
392-93 (1970) (statements of Morton A. Hill and Winfrey C. Link)).
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sis, even speech that receives maximum first amendment protec-
tion can be restricted for a sufficiently compelling reason.'
Whether pornography in general and child pornography in par-
ticular actually cause a viewer to commit sexual or violent crimes
has been the subject of recent study and much heated debate.""
The respondents in American Booksellers advanced this argument
to justify proposed restrictions on adult pornography.6 5 The argu-
ment has also been used to justify the state's power to criminalize
private possession of child pornography. 6 The court in American
Booksellers held, however, that even if the premise that viewing
pornography causes harmful behavior were accurate, the restriction
on speech was too great to justify an antipornography ordinance. 7
Balancing the Interests
Discussing the conflict between first amendment protections and
the state's interest in safeguarding the welfare of its children, the
Court in Ferber held that the "balance of competing interests"
would not preclude the state from exercising its regulatory power
to criminalize the production and distribution of child pornogra-
phy.168 Extending a state's regulatory power to the criminalization
of private possession, however, does not necessarily follow from the
analysis in Ferber, because different interests are involved. The
state's interest in the welfare of its children must be balanced
against the strong first and fourth amendment protections estab-
lished in Stanley.6  First amendment case law has established
that even speech at the core of the first amendment can be re-
163. Schauer, supra note 10, at 304-06.
164. E.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985); 1 ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48; Blakeley, supra note 144; Comment, The Indianapo-
lis Pornography Ordinance: Does the Right to Free Speech Outweigh Pornography's Harm
to Women?, 54 UNIV. OF CINN. L. REV. 249 (1985).
165. See American Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d at 325, 329 & n.2.
166. Brief for Defendant, State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986)
(No. 86-233), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987); Recent Developments in Utah Law, supra
note 119, at 176.
167. 771 F.2d at 329-31. Accord T. EMERSON, supra note 10, at 497-98 (arguing that this
link is far too tenuous to be useful and that the possible advantage of preventing some
crime would not outweigh the damage done to freedom of expression).
168. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 33-47.
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stricted if the competing interest is strong enough. 170 Proponents
of a state's authority to regulate the private possession of child
pornography should therefore have to demonstrate a state interest
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the first and fourth amendment
protection of the private possession of otherwise unprotected
speech.
Because some evidence may link private possession of child por-
nography and child sexual abuse, 171 supporters of criminalization
contend that this danger justifies a state's power to regulate pri-
vate possession. A careful analysis of this argument demonstrates,
however, that the proposed remedy-criminalization of private
possession of child pornography-is not directly related to the
harms intended to be prevented.
Once the material has been produced, states cannot prevent the
initial harm, which occurs in the production itself. States can, how-
ever, prevent the subsequent injury to the child victim that occurs
when such material is exhibited, traded between collectors, or
sold. 7 2 Publication of this material "arguably imposes a harm on
the child victim analogous to the emotional harm redressed in the
invasion of privacy tort.' 73 The remedy for such an injury is lim-
ited to civil damages, and does not include criminal sanctions
against the speech itself.17 4 The state's interest in regulating child
pornography therefore "is better characterized as protection of the
child from emotional and psychological harm . . 175 This is the
interest against which the importance of the first and fourth
amendment protections of private possession must be weighed.
170. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Schauer, supra note 10, at
305.
171. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 649-50.
172. "A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording
is circulating within the mass distribution system for child pornography.... [H]e must
carry with him the distressful feeling that his act has been recorded for all to see." Shouvlin,
supra note 57, at 545. See also People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 286, 431 N.E.2d 27,
31-32 (1982) (noting that the continuing fear of exposure from distribution is as damaging
as the initial sexual exploitation); 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 650.
"Each time the pornography is exchanged the children involved are victimized again." Id. at
651.
173. Note, Protection of Children From Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and
Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 295, 301 (1979).
174. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 809-12 (4th ed. 1971).
175. Note, supra note 173, at 316 n.123.
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Although the child is harmed simply by the continued existence
of the pornographic material,1 6 practical considerations make this
an insufficient basis on which to justify a statute that so strongly
impacts first amendment rights. Each time the photographs
change hands, the child victim is harmed again. 17 The states, how-
ever, already have the authority to prohibit these transactions.'78
Although the child will never be sure that all photographs have
been destroyed, this harm cannot be redressed by criminal sanc-
tions. Because photographs "are timeless and may be distributed
and circulated throughout the world for years after they are ini-
tially created," e79 a ban on private possession is necessarily less ef-
fective in protecting the child victim's privacy rights than strong
sanctions against production and distribution.
Proponents of a state's right to prohibit private possession of
child pornography also argue that pedophiles use such materials to
solicit the participation of other children in sexual activity.180 Al-
though states have a strong interest in preventing this solicitation,
criminalization of private possession will not necessarily deter such
activity. Pedophiles' 8 ' often have extensive collections of erotica,
including both child and adult pornography," 2 and research indi-
cates that they are just as likely to use adult pornography as child
pornography to lower the inhibitions of a child victim.' Criminal-
izing the private possession of child pornography therefore may
not have the desired effect of decreasing opportunities for child
abuse.
176. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 651.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982) (private exhi-
bition of child pornography not protected); People v. Godek, 113 Misc. 2d 599, 449 N.Y.S.2d
428 (Sup. Ct. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984) (noncommercial exchange of child
pornography denied constitutional protection).
179. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 651.
180. Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 610, 649-50.
181. The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography defines a pedophile as a person
having a clear sexual preference for children. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48,
at 609.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 686.
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Administrative Convenience
A second argument in support of allowing states to prohibit pri-
vate possession is that this prohibition is a necessary incident to
controlling production and distribution of child pornography. This
argument rests on the alleged difficulty of proving other offenses,
such as production, distribution, and exhibition. 184 In response to
the same argument, the Court in Stanley stated that even if such
difficulties existed, "we do not think that they would justify in-
fringement of the individual's right to read or observe what he
pleases."'18 5 The Court found that right "so fundamental to our
scheme of individual liberty [that] its restriction may not be justi-
fied by the need to ease the administration of otherwise valid crim-
inal laws."'8 6
The Court has rejected this administrative convenience argu-
ment in many other contexts as a rationale for restricting funda-
mental rights. 8 7 In People v. Spargo,'88 the state advanced the ad-
ministrative convenience rationale to justify its regulation of the
private, noncommercial exhibition of child pornography outside
the home. 89 The court applied Stanley to the possession of child
pornography and held that "[w]hatever constitutional protections
Stanley confers were relinquished by the defendant when he re-
moved the child pornography from the confines of his own home
and exhibited it to another." 90 The court also reasoned that a ban
184. See, e.g., 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 413 ("virtually all child
pornography is produced surreptitiously, and thus . . . enforcement will be difficult");
Loken, Child Pornography-A Turning Point, 16 THE PROSECUTOR 15, 16 (Summer 1982)
(noting the clandestine nature of the child pornography industry and the difficulties inher-
ent in monitoring the same of pornographic material); Note, supra note 63, at 346 (organ-
ized crime is now deeply involved in child pornography).
185. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (administrative convenience
cannot stand as the sole rationale for a statute that distinguished on the basis of sex); Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (administrative convenience cannot justify criminal con-
viction for possession of an obscene book when the defendant had no knowledge of the
book's content).
188. 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 431 N.E.2d 27 (1982).
189. Id. at 285, 431 N.E.2d at 30.
190. Id.
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
on private, noncommercial exhibition of child pornography would
discourage production by decreasing demand for this material.191
No evidence presently supports the contention that prohibiting
the private possession of child pornography would significantly ad-
vance the state's interest in deterring child abuse.192 Most recom-
mendations have focused on production and distribution as the
causes of harm to the child victim. 93 The states' adoption of uni-
form laws directed against production and distribution of child
pornography would be more effective.9 4 For example, the rate of
federal prosecutions increased dramatically following the 1984 re-
visions that strengthened the federal Child Protection Act. 95
Because states are not limited to regulating child pornography
that moves in interstate commerce, they may prohibit all produc-
tion and trafficking in such material.9 6 The report of the Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography notes that some states do
not yet ban trafficking, an activity that harms the child victim
more than private possession does, and which would carry a
harsher penalty. 97
Statutory prohibition of the private possession of child pornog-
raphy is an inefficient and ineffective means of preventing the seri-
ous problem of child sexual abuse. Although most pedophiles col-
lect child pornography,9 8 all collectors are not necessarily child
molesters.'99 States may, however, prosecute collectors who also
distribute or produce pornographic material for these more serious
offenses, which will carry heavier penalties than mere possession.
The efficacy of any sentence, of course, depends on its actual im-
191. Id.
192. Studies indicate that the enforcement of existing child pornography and child abuse
laws is itself problemetical. Abusers can be "average" citizens as well as depraved individu-
als on the edge of society. The former often are not prosecuted or are released with only a
fine. D. ScoTT, supra note 121, at 13.
193. See, e.g., Shouvlin, supra note 57, at 544-45; Note, supra note 173, at 299-301.
194. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 660-64, 670-71.
195. Id. at 606-07.
196. Id. at 607.
197. Id. at 608.
198. Id. at 609, 681.
199. For example, the court in Meadows found no indication that the defendant had par-
ticipated in any unlawful activity except the possession of magazines depicting children en-
gaging in sexual activities. State v. Meadows, No. C-850091 (Ohio App. Dec. 18, 1985), rev'd,
28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987).
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pact on the abuser. 00 Practicality demands that limited law en-
forcement resources are best spent in prosecuting those who are
involved in the more harmful offenses of producing and distribut-
ing child pornography.20 '
CONCLUSION
A close reading of the Supreme Court's decision in New York v.
Ferber suggests that the Court did not intend its ruling to do more
than alter the standard for child pornography so the states could
regulate the production and distribution of this material regardless
of any obscenity requirement.20 2 The purpose of expanding the
states' power to regulate was to prevent the abuse of children used
to produce the material.203 Although advocates of the states' power
to criminalize the private possession of child pornography contend
that their purpose is likewise to prevent child abuse, they face two
obstacles, one practical and one constitutional. First, criminalizing
private possession may not have the desired effect of reducing the
incidence of child abuse. 0 4 Second, the constitutional protections
against which this purpose is weighed are much stronger for the
case of private possession than for production or distribution. 5
Stanley v. Georgia and its progeny established that a state could
regulate unprotected speech everywhere except when it was pri-
vately possessed in the home.20 6 The Ferber holding placed all
child pornography on the same footing as material that is obscene
under the Miller v. California test.20 7 The inescapable conclusion
200. One case report states that an offender caught in the act of sexually molesting a
child received a sentence of five years imprisonment, all but six months of which were sus-
pended. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 48, at 685-86.
201. See id. at 660-71 (recommending that states toughen their child pornography laws to
make many offenses a felony).
202. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) (explaining that the decision
removed the requirements of the Miller test and effectively equated all child pornography
with obscenity as defined in Miller).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. Any doubt as to the Court's intention to
do more than address the problem of child abuse in prodaction is dispelled by its sugges-
tion, in dictum, that "if it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the
statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 176-83, 192.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
207. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
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is that the state is free to regulate material depicting child pornog-
raphy except when an individual possesses it "in the privacy of his
own home. ' 08
Susan G. Caughlan
208. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
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